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I. THE SUBNATIONAL TAPESTRY
Subnational units of government are critical actors in the U.S. federalist 
scheme of regulation.  It was the original 13 colonies/states which were
the core of the American experiment, and banded together as a nation for
common defense and commerce after fighting for independence from the 
United Kingdom.  The Constitution vested in the new federal government 
the treaty and war powers, as well as powers over interstate commerce.1 
In the 21st century, there is a national and international challenge to control 
global emission of climate warming gases.  And the primary source of those
gases in both the U.S. and the world is the production of electric power, 
as displayed in Figure 1.2 Global energy-related emissions are expected to 
increase fifty-seven percent from 2005 to 2030.3 At current rates of energy 
development, energy-related CO2 emissions in 2050 would be 137% of their 
current levels under business-as-usual.4  It is estimated that this would be
unsustainable and that life as we know it would change fundamentally with
the warming of the climate.5 
However, to regulate the production of those heat-trapping gases from 
electric power, U.S. policy does not deploy Federal Power Act authority over 
the electric sector.  Instead, the modus operandi to regulate these emissions
is environmental law.  Subnational units of government exercise a critical
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; U.S. Const. art. I, § 
8, cl. 3
2. U.S. EPA., Sources of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, http://www.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html.
3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-151, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE PROGRAMS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING
SCHEME AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL’S CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM 48 (2008), http://
www.gao.gov/assets/290/283397.pdf.
4. WILLIAM C. RAMSAY, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES:
SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES TO 2050, PRESS CONFERENCE AT OECD TOKYO CENTER at 5 
(July 14, 2006),  http://www.unece.lsu.edu/biofuels/documents/2007July/SRN_020.pdf. 
5. THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, Climate Change: Threats and Impacts, http://www. 
nature.org/ourinitiatives/urgentissues/global-warming-climate-change/threats-impacts/.
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role in these efforts to regulate air emissions, with the states in the U.S.
taking the lead on climate control.  Here, the law leaves critical gaps. 
FIGURE 1 
Total U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
by Economic Sector in 2014 
Total Emissions in 2014 = 6,870 Million Metric Tons of
CO2 equivalent
* Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry in the United 
States is a net sink and offsets approximately 11% of these 
greenhouse gas emissions.
All emission estimates from the Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2014 
      Source: http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/sources.html.
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The division between state and federal legal jurisdiction over energy is 
defined by the Supreme Court as a “bright line” not subject to exception, 
however there is a “cooperative federalism” between state and federal 
authority under the Clean Air Act in regulating emissions.  Because the 
new federal Clean Power Plan for carbon regulation is implemented through 
the Clean Air Act, although it affects only energy facilities, these distinctions
have carved gaps and crevices in the legal mechanism to move forward. 
B. Energy Versus Environment 
There can be a conflict between the need to instantaneously generate 
electric power and the need to reduce environmental emissions resulting 
therefrom.  It is completely unclear which law dominates.  While one 
would think that there would be direction in a statute or a regulation, or at 
least subsequent determination by a court, there is no legal precedent or 
guidance whatsoever on this critical question.  Commissioners of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) warned of an upcoming “train
wreck” in the Administration’s new Clean Power Plan to reduce CO2 from 
power plants using environmental regulation rather than jurisdiction over 
electric sector operations. 
C. The Clean Power Plan and Subnational Discretion 
The Obama administration promulgated in the latter half of 2015 the Clean
Power Plan, an extremely ambitious 1550-page regulation to dramatically
limit CO2 emissions from larger power generation facilities.  It did so by
setting dramatically inconsistent and different “best system” standards for 
each of the states, and then leaving the complete choice of implementation 
methods entirely to each state.  While this is consistent with the doctrine 
of “cooperative federalism,” states are not self-contained jurisdictions
regarding electric power production. The United States Supreme Court 
held that:
it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or
manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this respect.6 
6. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982) (citing FPC v. Florida Power & 
Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)). 
34
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So, by a federal law prescribing a 2018 deadline, states are left to act
alone regarding the commodity most prevalent in interstate commerce in
the United States—electricity.  Many states are not cooperating:
●	 The governors of 6 states threatened not to comply with the Clean Power Plan
even before its regulations were promulgated in final form.7 
●	 Fifteen states sued EPA before the EPA regulations were final to enjoin EPA 
from moving forward with the Clean Power Plan.8 
●	 Litigation continues by more than half of all the states challenging the Clean
Power Plan as this article goes to press.




Thirty-four of the U.S. states are members of three multistate Independent
System Operators (“ISOs”) which manage all transmission and sale of 
wholesale power in their often large, multi-state regions, shown in Figure 
2. Compliance by these thirty-four states with the Clean Power Plan to 
limit CO2 from power generation cannot occur without regard to how power
actually is being managed and moving at the speed of light within their 
multi-state ISOs. The ISO least-cost reliability protocols for the operation
of power plants and power transmissions will be at odds with some of the 
subnational state decisions. 
 7. Anthony Adragna, Mississippi Threatens to Ignore Clean Power Plan, BLOOMBERG
BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP., July 24, 2015. 
8. In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir 2015), reh’g denied
(Sept. 29, 2015) (Plaintiffs included: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming); Oklahoma ex rel. Pruitt v. McCarthy, No. 15-5066 (10th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015). 
 35
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FIGURE 2: NATIONAL INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATORS
All of these issues weave together at the subnational level in the still­
being-created legal tapestry of carbon control.  While each of these issues 
above merits its own lengthy discussion, this article is the loom on which
we examine some key threads in the carbon legal fabric. 
Section II examines the legal tension between the requirement to generate
sufficient electricity to power the grid, and the need to protect the environment
from related deterioration.  We examine the conflicts between different
federal energy and federal environmental agencies, between state and federal
regulators, and between key provisions of the U.S. Constitution and state 
regulators. 
Section III moves to the new front of the legal issue:  The Clean Power
Plan regulations. We examine how the new federal Plan creates a more
disaggregated “mash” of subnational state choices, which will fracture even 
more objectives for energy reliability.  We examine the range of pending 
and precedent legal challenges by states to this new regulatory order, with 
particular analysis of the interstate nature of CO2 and other global warming
emissions and state discretion under existing precedent. 
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN REGULATION OF ENERGY AND 

ENVIRONMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY
 
“[A] jurisdictional train wreck”9 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission   
 Commissioner Tony Clark, 2014
  Congressional testimony on conflict 
  between environmental regulation and 
  power system reliability.
With all of the FERC Commissioners testifying, Commissioner Tony
Clark predicted “a jurisdictional train wreck” between the Clean Air Act
regulation of carbon emissions and the Federal Power Act requirement for 
FERC to maintain uninterrupted electric system reliability.10 Electric system
reliability in America is not a technical issue of insufficient supply resources, 
but rather a legal issue of various energy and environmental statutes and
orders working at cross-purposes to the other.  Reliable electricity supply 
requires a constant, second-by-second simultaneous balancing of power 
generation supply to meet demand on the utility grid.11 
The United States electric grid would collapse within approximately
four seconds if sufficient generation of power was not constantly supplied 
to meet fluctuating consumer demand.12  Either too much or too little power 
causes system instability; a loss of power would disrupt communication, 
transportation, heating, water supplies, hospitals, and hospital emergency
9. FERC Perspectives: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan
and other Grid Reliability Challenges: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Commissioner Tony Clark of FERC;) see also
Lynn Garner, FERC Comm’rs Split on Party Lines Over EPA’s Carbon Rule for Power Plants, 





 11. See Andrew Howe, Demanding Times, 29 UTIL. WEEK 18, Sept. 19, 2008, at 7,
available at Business Source Premier, EBSCOhost (discussing challenges of balancing supply
and demand within energy grid). 
12. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 568
(6th ed. 2013); Jack Casazza & Frank Delea, UNDERSTANDING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TECHNOLOGY, THE MARKETPLACE, AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
(R. Akbari et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2010). 
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rooms.13  This poses a legal challenge:  According to energy industry leaders
and members of the FERC, an irreconcilable conflict lurks between increased 
federal environmental regulations of power plants and federal rules aimed
at maintaining the reliability of the nation’s electricity grid.14 
No federal law, statute, or regulation in the United States creates any 
overarching legal hierarchy regarding whether environmental restrictions 
or commands to maintain the electric grid dominate when the two conflict,
as they now increasingly will. FERC Commissioner Philip Moeller testified 
that the environmental approach for emissions reductions from power plants
is “an enforcement regime that would be awkward at best, and potentially 
very inefficient and expensive.”15 FERC Commissioners Moeller and Clark
characterized the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) carbon
regulations in the Clean Power Plan as a fundamental change in energy
markets, injecting environmental factors into how power plants are allowed
to run.16 
Where there is statutory conflict, the judicial branch is the source of 
resolution. However, in 2016, 80 years after enactment of the Federal
Power Act,17 there is no applicable judicial precedent.  There is only the
somewhat provocative Supreme Court dictum from forty years ago, when 
the Court stated that it is never impossible for a coal-fired electric power
plant to comply with any environmental requirements because it always
has the option to cease operation.  Should environmental statutes and resultant 
emission permits, which limit power plant pollution, override energy agency
orders and requirements to operate power generation facilities to keep the 
lights on?  Alternatively, should the requirement of twenty-four seven reliable 
energy supply override environmental laws and limits on operation of
power generation facilities? That is the legal question. 
13. Michael Bruch et al., Power Blackout Risks: Risk Management Options, Emerging
Risk Initiative, CRO Forum Position Paper 12 (Nov. 2011), https://www.allianz.com/v_ 
1339677769000/media/responsibility/documents/position_paper_power_blackout_risks.pdf.
14. See Order Accepting Forward Capacity Auction Results Filing, Federal Energy 
Guidelines: FERC Reports 140 FERC 61,143 (Aug. 27, 2012); Electric Grid Reliability
Problems: The Result of EPA Regulations? INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/electric-grid-reliability-problems-the-result 
-of-epa-regulations/. 
15. Garner, supra note 9, at 2.  FERC Commissioner Philip Moeller stated that the
biggest challenge in implementing the proposed rule is that electricity markets are interstate
in nature, while EPA has a state-by-state approach for emissions reductions. 
16. Garner, supra note 9, at 1.
17.  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824a (2006). 
38
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A. Power Shortfalls and Air Emissions 
We start in the air:  As part of national air regulation, there is a specified 
division of state and federal authority under the Clean Air Act: States have 
the “first-implementer role,”18 while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary
role.”19 The Act’s scheme has been interpreted “as erecting a statutory 
federalism bar” that “prohibits EPA from using the State Implementation 
Plan (SIP) process to force [s]tates to adopt specific control measures.”20 
If a state’s SIP would result in compliance with federal EPA air standards, 
EPA may not question the choices of the state as to how it complies with 
requirements.21 Moreover, EPA cannot condition its approval of state 
implementation plans on the adoption of specific emission control measures
by states.22 
However, where states do not adequately implement Clean Air Act
requirements, the federal EPA can step forward to do so.  The D.C. Circuit 
upheld EPA’s imposition of federal Clean Air Act implementation plans 
for states which failed to require Prevention of Significant Deterioration 
(PSD) permits for stationary sources which emit greenhouse gases.23 
Notwithstanding this residual federal back-stop authority, even before the
unprecedented carbon reductions required by the Clean Power Plan, the 
conflict between large power plant operation and environmental air quality
goals was in play.
Virginia’s Mirant Potomac River Generating Station in 2005 was shut
down on two days’ notice “in response to emissions abatement concerns
raised by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality” (“DEQ”).24 
18.  Train v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
19. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014) (quoting Train, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975)) (emphasis omitted). 
20. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 29. 
21. Train, 421 U.S. at 79. 
22.  Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1401-11 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
23. Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2013). While the challenge was
dismissed on standing, it distinguished the environmental regulation from the higher concern
on federal coercion of the states identified in the prior Supreme Court decision on the 
Affordable Care Act. 
24. See The American Energy Initiative: Hearing on H.R. 4273, The Resolving
Environmental and Grid Reliability Conflicts Act of 2012, and H.R. 5892, The Hydropower
Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2012 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the H. 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 112th Cong. 108 (May 9, 2012), [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Betty Ann Kane, Chairperson, D.C. Public Service Commission) (stating the
state had delegated authority from EPA to enforce federal clean air laws), https://energy
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Because the plant was deemed as reliability-critical for serving the nation’s 
capital with electricity, the D.C. Public Service Commission filed emergency 
petitions with the U.S. Department of Energy and FERC asking the federal 
agencies to order the Potomac facility to continue operations notwithstanding 
Clean Air Act environmental permit violations.25 
The Virginia DEQ countered to FERC that “Congress has not given the
Federal Power Act primacy over the Clean Air Act” and that “[n]owhere in 
the Federal Power Act—§ 202(c) or elsewhere—is there language providing 
that [energy] reliability concerns take precedence over federal and state 
environmental laws.”26  This lack of any legal guidance between energy 
and environmental requirements is manifested in all federal energy and 
environmental laws.  Four weeks after the shutdown, before any emergency
orders were issued, Potomac voluntarily resumed operations.27 Only some 
months later, U.S. DOE issued an order requiring the plant to maintain
operations.28 Subsequently, Virginia DEQ fined Potomac $52,000 for
Clean Air Act violations that occurred after it had resumed operations and
before the DOE order.29 This conflict illustrates the proverbial trap between 
an energy “rock” and an environmental “hard place.”  The law had no 
guidance, let alone a solution.
B. Power Shortfalls and Water Emissions 
The history of these conflicts affects the water, as well as the air we breathe. 
In 2012, the GenOn Kendall Station plant in Cambridge, Massachusetts
would have had to either violate the plant’s Clean Water Act National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) discharge permit or 
violate an order to it issued by the FERC-authorized and FERC-regulated
New England Independent System Operator (“ISO-NE”),30 requiring the
commerce.house.gov/hearings-and-votes/hearings/american-energy-initiative-hearing­
resolving-environmental-and-grid (click on Transcript).
25. Id. 
26. Letter from Commonwealth of Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality to Kevin Kolevar,
Dir., Office of Elec. Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Dep’t of Energy at 2 (Nov. 23, 
2005) (on file with Office of Elec. Delivery and Energy Reliability). 
27. See The American Energy Initiative, Part 19: Focus on H.R. 4273, The Resolving
Environmental and Grid Reliability Conflicts Act of 2012, and H.R. ——, The Hydropower
Regulatory Effect Act of 2012 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce,




30. ISO-NE was created by FERC to oversee the operation of the bulk electric power
system and transmission lines in the New England area. See Electric Power Markets: New 
England (ISO-NE), FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/new-england
.asp#rto.
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plant to continue running at full capacity to ensure that the electric grid 
operated to serve the greater Boston area.31 ISOs are FERC-sponsored 
managers of regional transmission grids, see Figure 2, and legally authorized
pursuant to federal law.32 ISOs manage regional power transmission utilities 
pursuant to ISO-filed tariffs which must be approved by FERC pursuant 
to the Federal Power Act.33 
EPA demanded that the plant comply with its environmental water
discharge permit limits by taking twenty-seven megawatts (“MW”) of the 
plant’s generating capacity off-line and out of operation,34 while ISO-NE 
ordered that Kendall Station’s full generating capacity—including the 
twenty-seven MW at issue with EPA—was “critical to reliability within
the Northeast Massachusetts/Boston Load Zone.”35  When Kendall Station
responded to the EPA demand by requesting ISO-NE to allow it to “de­
list” the twenty-seven Mw that EPA order not to operate, ISO-NE refused 
and issued an order requiring Kendall Station to continue operating at full 
capacity.36 GenOn appealed ISO-NE’s order to FERC in a legal attempt to 
resolve the conflict created between environmental and energy requirements.37 
31.  ISO New Eng., Inc., 140 FERC ¶ 61,143 at 61,665 (2012). 
32. United States Government Accountability Office, Electricity Restructuring: FERC 
Could Take Additional Steps to Analyze Regional Transmission Organizations’ Benefits and
Performance, GAO-08-987 (2008) (FERC oversees six RTOs that cover part or all of 35 states
and D.C.).  In the PJM ISO, which serves multiple Eastern states, there are two retail energy 
markets, a real-time (spot) and a day-ahead (forward) market. The basis of calculating
the electricity price in either market is Locational Marginal Pricing. PJM’s capacity-market
model, the Reliability Pricing Model, was implemented in 2007 as the successor to its Capacity
Credit Market design, as a series of auctions for a delivery year approximately three years in
the future. PJM’s demand curve, the Variable Resources Requirement, defines the price for a 
given capacity commitment relative to the applicable reliability requirement, defined for each 
constrained Locational Delivery Area. PJM, Agreements/Governing Documents, http:// 
www.pjm.com/documents/agreements.aspx; FERC, Electric Power Markets: PJM, http:// 
www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp. 
 33. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) or Independent System Operators
(ISOs) are FERC-approved and regulated entities, which facilitate commercial electricity
transfers, through a private corporation that function as a tariff administrator. RTOs are 
responsible for managing both electrical and financial transactions, including scheduling 
transmission transactions, dispatching generation, and managing the entire accounting for
the grid capacity and energy charges and transmission fees. See  FERREY, THE LAW
OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 1, §§ 8:10, 10:87, 10:91; STEVEN FERREY, THE NEW
RULES, at 49–50 (PENNWELL PUBLISHERS, 2000). 
34.  ISO New Eng., Inc., supra note 31, at 61,665–66. 
35. Id. at ¶ 61,668 (Clark, C., concurring). 
36. Id. at ¶ 61,666. 
37. Id. 
 41
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Based on a procedural reason, FERC declined to decide the issue of whether 
the NPDES environmental water discharge requirements or the regional
electric energy grid reliability requirements had precedence.38 
C. Conflicting Authority Silos over CO2 and Power Reliability 
1. Between Federal Agencies
There is conflict between federal agencies each exercising authority
from their respective jurisdictional silos: the authority of the two primary
federal agencies with relevant authority over these issues is legally distinct 
and separate as applied.  The EPA has no specific jurisdiction over energy, 
even though it exercises jurisdiction over power generation facility emissions 
of certain magnitudes of identified pollutants.  With the exception of 
hydroelectric generation-related environmental matters, FERC regulates
no environmental matters which are subject to FERC jurisdiction under
Part I of the Federal Power Act.39  This Act directs FERC to regulate all 
interstate electricity transmission and to ensure the reliability of the national
electricity grid.40  Federal Power Act sections 205 and 20641 empower
FERC exclusively to regulate rates for the interstate and wholesale sale and 
transmission of electricity.42 
2. Between Similar State and Federal Agencies
There are significant conflicts between the exercise of federal and state
authority over energy, as well as whether there are mitigating environmental 
reasons for a state to over-reach its authority.  California used environmental
justifications for an energy regulation to encourage distributed on-site
 38. Id. at ¶ 61,667 (noting that ISO-NE intended to reconsider GenOn’s request to
de-list the twenty-seven Mw before the plant’s deadline for compliance with the NPDES 
permit); ISO New Eng., 140 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, at 61,667 (FERC also suggested that
GenOn could reduce Kendall Station’s generating capacity by twenty-seven MW and still 
supply the same amount of power to the grid by purchasing the generation capacity from 
another producer); id. (stating that GenOn could submit “a demand bid in reconfiguration
auctions, or [enter] into a bilateral contract to supply [the electricity]”); id. at 61,667–68 
(after hearing Kendall Station’s appeal, two FERC commissioners urged Congress to resolve
the potential conflict) (Moeller, C. concurring) (Clark, C., concurring). 
39. See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Sellers of Energy and Ancillary Serv., 96
FERC ¶ 61,117, at ¶ 61,448 (2001); PSI Energy, Inc., 56 FERC ¶ 61,237, at ¶ 61,911 n.27
(1991); Duke Power Co., 43 FERC ¶ 61,001, at ¶ 61,003 (1988); Monongahela Power Co., 
39 FERC ¶ 61,350, at ¶ 62,096 (June 1987), 40 FERC ¶ 61,256, at ¶ 61,861 (Sept. 1987). 
40.  Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–828 at §§ 797, 824(a) (2012).  
41. Id. at § 824. 
42. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County Washington v. FERC, 471 F.3d
1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom., Morgan Stanley
Capital Group, Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527 (2008). 
42
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combined heat and power generation by mandating that utilities and their 
customers pay such generators more than the market price for their power 
sold to the California utilities.43 After enacting a feed-in-tariff (“FIT”) 
requiring California state utilities to make these wholesale power purchases 
in excess of wholesale market rates for power and in excess of wholesale
“avoided costs” established under the Federal Power Act, California was 
challenged before the FERC as to whether this violated the Federal Power 
Act and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.44 
California argued that (1) its environmental purpose for regulation should
make it exempt from preemption under the Supremacy Clause in setting 
above-market wholesale renewable FIT rates for cogeneration facilities of
less than twenty MW and (2) that environmental costs could be considered
to inflate avoided costs under the federal Public Utilities Regulatory Policies 
Act (“PURPA”).45  The affected California utilities countered that: (1)
federal law does not allow state regulation of wholesale sales even if used 
to achieve state environmental goals, (2) federal preemption cannot be 
avoided based on an environmental purpose of the preempted state regulation, 
and (3) states may not, under the guise of environmental regulation, adopt 
an economic regulation that requires purchases of electricity at a wholesale
price outside the framework of the Federal Power Act or, if acting under 
PURPA, at a price which exceeds “avoided cost.”46 
FERC rejected all of California’s arguments using environmental rationales 
to justify the state’s establishment of wholesale energy power purchase rates 
in excess of limits set by federal law or as set by FERC.47  In response to 
California argument that its environmentally beneficial purposes should make
it exempt from constitutional preemption in setting non-market-conforming
wholesale rates for a state FIT,48 FERC found that the state purpose does not 
permit illegal establishment of FITs requiring purchases of electricity at 
inflated wholesale prices.49  Renewable wholesale generators could receive no 
more than fair wholesale market prices under federal law.50 FERC reiterated 
43.  Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 132 FERC ¶ 61,047, 61,326–27 (July 15, 2010). 
44. Id.
 45. Id.
 46. Id. ¶ 61,337. 
47. Id.
48. 132 FERC at ¶ 61,337. 
49. Id. ¶ 61,338 (rejected all of California’s arguments regarding generic environmental 
rationales for wholesale rates in excess of limits under federal law or set by FERC).
50. Cal. Public Utils. Comm’n, 133 FERC ¶ 61,059, 61,265 (Oct. 21, 2010) (granting 
clarification and dismissing rehearing). 
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that only the federal government can regulate commerce between the 
states, and California cannot attempt to regulate commerce outside its 
borders.51 
Energy and environmental preemption are positionally inverse.  While 
the Federal Power Act preempts certain state energy regulatory authority,
on environmental matters under the Clean Air Act, states enjoy the first 
implementer role.  The federal EPA has “no authority to question the wisdom 
of a state’s choice of emission limitations if they are part of a plan which
satisfies the standards of [Section 110 of the Clean Air Act].”52  With the
federal government exercising the preemptive hand on certain energy
matters, while states exercise the first upper hand on certain environmental
matters, the lack of any guidance on energy versus environmental regulation 
baked into federal statutes, is juxta-positioned in its exercise.  This does 
not facilitate practical clarity. 
III. THE NEW CLEAN POWER PLAN AND SUBNATIONAL DISCRETION
Recent federal regulation has deepened the divide between state and 
federal regulation, rather than bridged it.  A significant legal battle now
looms with the 2015 promulgation of the new EPA Clean Power Plan by
unilateral executive branch regulation.  The Clean Power Plan, in addition
to its substantive provisions to attempt to limit power plant CO2 emissions,
sets in motion jurisdictional and cooperative federalism provisions: 
●	 Imposing federal rate-based CO2 emission limits on states related to their
power production facilities, but not imposing those directly on the sources
themselves unless EPA imposes a federal implementation plan because a state 
refuses to create a state plan within three years;
●	 Not taking account of the grid reliability aspects of power generation units;
●	 Giving the states discretion and three years to develop plans to achieve these 
CO2 emission reduction either at the generation plants or outside the facilities; 
●	 Allowing the states to develop and implement either rate-based or mass-based 
emission limitations as part of their state plans;
●	 Allowing the states to meet the federal requirements individually, or through
combining efforts and standards with other states.
 51. Id.; see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 584 (1986); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)
(“[One state] has no power to project its legislation into [another state] by regulating the 
price to be paid in that state for [products] acquired there.”). 
52. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1407–08 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Union
Electric Co. v. Train, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)). 
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These jurisdictional variations could put several states at odds with EPA 
or their ISO energy-regulated regions, and place FERC at odds with EPA.
There is significant subnational discretion in the Plan.  At issue, also in legal 
challenges, is whether EPA has the authority unilaterally to implement by
regulation the Clean Power Plan, without additional legislative action and
new statutory law. This is not only an issue of the extent of executive
discretion, but also whether a conflict is created with the existing Clean Air
Act.
A. Existing Coal Facility Emission Reductions 
1. New Executive Branch Regulations 
Under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, EPA finalized different new 
rules in 2015 restricting CO2 emissions from existing power plants.53 Each 
state will be required to develop standards of performance to limit CO2 
emissions from existing generating facilities.54  Seventeen state attorneys
general filed comments highlighting “numerous legal defects” and system
reliability issues in the EPA’s proposal to regulate power plant emissions 
under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act.55  Environmental justice advocates 
told EPA that the proposed carbon dioxide limits for power plants “doesn’t
emphasize equity and offers too much flexibility to states,56 and more than
half the states currently are suing EPA regarding its authority to issue 
these regulations. 
EPA determined differentially the Section 111 Best System of Emission 
Reduction (BSER) based on each state’s mix of individual existing generating 
53. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,380, 34,832 (June 18, 2014) (“Proposed Rule” 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d).).  EPA also proposed standards for modified and reconstructed
sources. Carbon Pollution Standards for Modified and Reconstructed Stationary Sources, 79
Fed. Reg. 34,959 (proposed June 18, 2014).
54. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-452/R-13-003, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSION FOR
NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS, at 1–4 (2013), http:// 
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf. 
55. Patrick Ambrosio, Comments Show Split in State Support for EPA Proposed 
Power Plant Rule, BLOOMBERG BNA ENV’T REP., Dec. 2, 2014. The comments were signed
by attorneys general from Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West
Virginia and Wyoming. Id.
56. Rachel Leven, Power Plant Carbon Rule Lacks Equity, Environmental Justice 
Advocates Tell EPA, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP., Oct. 1, 2014. 
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sources as a statewide lbs/MWh emission rate.57  The “New Source Rule” 
issued by EPA establishes separate performance standards for new coal 
and gas-fired power plants.58 This requires states to flexibly determine 
how to reduce CO2 emissions. In various states this is up to a 50% cut in
carbon intensity of existing generation.59  States have freedom to use a mass- 
based or rate-based calculation and can come up with a multi-state plan.60 
This will allow state plans that establish administered CO2 controls “beyond
the fence line” of the affected project’s metes and bounds.  What is required
is for a state to hit an assigned state emission average for electricity
production.  States can comply by:61 
�  4.3–6% improvement for coal plant operating heat rates; 
�  More use of renewable energy; 
�  Dispatch the operation of cleaner power generation technologies. 
The governors in Texas, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Mississippi, and
Louisiana threatened not to comply with the final regulation of the Clean
Power Plan even before its regulations were promulgated in final form, 
while Oklahoma pledged not to comply with the rule regardless of its final
form.62  Fourteen states sued EPA before the EPA regulations were final 
to enjoin EPA from moving forward with the Clean Power Plan, which
suit was dismissed as premature; and the states asked the D.C. Circuit to 
57. Id. 
58. Sullivan & Worchester, U.S. EPA Issues Proposed New Source Performance
Standard to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions from New Fossil Fuel Electricity Generating
Power Plants, Environment, Energy & Natural Resources Group Advisory (2014) (discussing 
that a “new source” does not include existing sources undertaking modifications or
reconstructions, and certain projects currently under development). 
59. Paul Decotis, What the Clean Power Plan Means for You & How to Tackle 
Building a Compliance Strategy, ENERGY BIZ (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.energybiz.com/ 
article/14/11/what-clean-power-plan-means-you-how-tackle-building-compliance-strategy. 
60. Rate-based limits for emissions limit the pounds of a pollutant emitted per 
million British thermal units of energy produced by a power generation facility.  Mass-
based limits do not deal with emissions from individual sources, but instead limit the mass
of regional emissions.  California A.B. 32, RGGI, and the EU-ETS utilize mass-based
limits for GHGs.  With mass-based limits, they can be achieved by using lower-emission
forms of generation such as renewable generation, or by reducing the need for power
through end use efficiency, but does not affect the rate of emissions per unit of energy
produced by conventional generators even when they operate for fewer hours. 
61. Jonathan L. Ramseur, State CO2 Emission Rate Goals in EPA’s Proposed Rule 
for Existing Power Plants, CRS REP., at 6–14 (Oct. 22, 2014), http://nationalaglawcenter.
org/wp-content/uploads//assets/crs/R43652.pdf.
62. Anthony Adragna, Mississippi Threatens to Ignore Clean Power Plan, 
BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT (July 24, 2015); see also Anthony Adragna, 
States Should Resist EPA Clean Power Plan: Pence, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY &
CLIMATE REP. (July 9, 2015).
46
     
 
   
 
   
 
 









       
     
          
 
FERREY2 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/19/2016 10:07 AM 
[VOL. 7:  31, 2015–16] Subnational Discretion 
SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW
rehear the case a month before the regulations were promulgated.63 Oklahoma
brought a separate pre-promulgation suit against the EPA Clean Power 
Plan which also was dismissed as premature, and resulted in an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.64  The Supreme Court took
the highly unusual step of staying/enjoining operation of the Clean Power 
Plan in 2016, even before the D.C. Circuit had heard appeal against the 
plan.65  This will likely stay in place until the D.C. Circuit issues an opinion 
in 2017, and perhaps until the Supreme Court renders a decision on appeal
in 2018 or later.  State plans were required to be submitted to the EPA in 
2018.
So, if this regulation is upheld after the now ongoing litigation, it could 
affect the frequency of dispatch orders for coal plants, which is key to
whether or not they are operated in the future.  Figure 3 shows the relative 
degree of GHG emissions by state, with the darker colors illustrating greater 
GHG emissions. 
63.  Petition for Rehearing at 23-4, In re Murray Energy Corp., 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1112), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/2015.07.24_murray
_peabody_pet._for_rehearing_motion_to_stay_mandate.pdf (claiming that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision June 9 applied too narrow a reading 
of authority under the All Writs Act. Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas,  Kentucky,
Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming 
were the 14 states asking for rehearing). 
64. Notice of Appeal at 9, Okla. ex rel. Pruitt v. McCarthy, No. 15-05066 (10th Cir. July
21, 2015). 
65. Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 999 (Mem) (Feb. 9, 2016) No. 15A787, 
2016 WL 502658. 
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FIGURE 3: GHG EMISSIONS, 201266 
2. CPP Options for States as Subnational Units of Government
States can allow trading or not of allowances with other states.  Individual 
states can elect to roll new plants into coverage under their plans or not.
Every state has a different rate-based (lbs/Mwh) requirement, distinct from 
every other neighboring state and varying in total pounds of CO2 per unit 
of power produced by as much as a factor of 3:1 among states.  While the 
state implementation role carved out in the Clean Power Plan, on one level
gives states more control, it also constricts states in many ways.  Because
two-thirds of the states and their utilities buy and sell wholesale power
through regional ISOs or similar regional transmission organizations 
(RTOs), the actual market for power is regional, although states are given 
individual in-state authority to limit carbon based on (and arguably from)
in-state existing power generation resources.
While this mechanism is subject to state discretion, the actual physical 
power markets are regional, and the back-stop authority is federal.  Therefore,
as opposed to other aspects of the Clean Air Act which are not aimed only 
66. Andy Kiersz and Brett LoGiurato, Here’s How Obama’s New Carbon Rules 
Affect Each State, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 3, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com.au 
/epa-state-carbon-goals-2014-6. 
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at the power sector, the Clean Power Plan is; it tests even more profoundly
“cooperative federalism” in the control of CO2. There are multiple other 
moving regulatory spheres:  Separately proposed in 2010 and finalized in 
2011, the Transport Rule (also known as the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule) 
addresses a state’s obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision in regards
to three other ambient air quality standards.67  With all of these moving pieces 
and discretion over markets operating not in synchronization at different
national and subnational levels of governance, the implementation is uncertain
and the legal authority itself under ongoing judicial challenge. 
B. Executive Branch CO2 Regulation of Power Generation
The environmental challenge of this decade is the litigation now beginning
regarding the jurisdictional authority of EPA to promulgate its recent Clean
Power Plan regulations by executive action, without further congressional 
authority. There are recent judicial markers for some of the issues presented
in Clean Power Plan litigation. 
A coalition of more than 20 states recently overturned EPA regulation 
of mercury and other hazardous pollutants because the “EPA must consider
cost—including cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation
is appropriate and necessary. . . .  One would not say that it is even 
rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions of dollars in economic
costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.”68  In
that challenged regulation, EPA attributed $37-90 billion in annual public
health benefits (not from the mercury and other hazardous air pollutant 
that were directly regulated but from secondary incidental reduction of 
fine particulate matter and other pollutants regulated under other sections 
of the Clean Air Act) even though the agency could only quantify $4-6 
million in benefits to reductions of hazardous air pollutants, a fraction of 
one percent of the EPA-claimed total “benefits.”69  The Administration’s
Clean Power Plan also counts a very large amount of “co-benefits” from 
reduction of other than the specifically targeted CO2, and counts many
 67. See EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d 7, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(addressing the three NAAQS including 1997 annual PM2.5, the 1997 ozone NAAQS, and 
the 2006 24-hour PM2.5); see also EPA Implementation Plans, 40 C.F.R. §§ 51-2, 72, 78, 
97 (2016); see also discussion infra Section III.D.
68. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2701–07 (2015) (noting 15 states supported
EPA’s MATS regulation while 23 states challenged it).
69. Id. at 2705–06. 
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international climate benefits with relatively limited domestic climate 
benefits, evaluated against substantial future domestic U.S. compliance 
costs. 
The 2014 Supreme Court Utility Air Regulatory Group majority opinion 
applied to new sources of fossil-fuel generation, casts doubt on going 
“beyond the fence line” for states to achieve compliance with the Clean
Power Plan, rather than regulating specific emission sources for CO2 at the
local plant site.70  This decision specifically references other court holdings 
that Clean Air Act Prevention of Deterioration (PSD) Best Available
Control Technology (BACT) pollution controls cannot be used to force 
fundamental re-design of the proposed source, and that EPA’s current
BACT guidance for greenhouse gases contemplates that only pollutants
emitted on-site by the source can be regulated.71 
A significant jurisdictional issue confronting the Clean Power Plan 
emanates from its exact language.  In the original Clean Air Act amendments 
in 1970, section (111(d) authorized EPA to establish a program for state 
regulation of existing sources within a source category when EPA sets a
New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) technology-based Best System 
of Emission Reduction standard for new and modified stationary sources 
in that category.72  The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments contained different 
Senate and House versions of amendments to Section 111(d) which were 
combined without clear reconciliation in the final enacted version of the 
amendments.  The Senate amendment was a technical amendment regarding
NSPS criteria pollutant regulation without substantive change; the House 
amendment made the same technical change and added that section 111(d)
could not be applied to a category of sources regulated under section 112 
which regulates hazardous air pollutants unrelated to the criteria pollutants. 
Both versions are included in the final amendments.  Neither is inconsistent
with the other, as far as the basic technical provision. 
Under the Senate version of Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, if a
source category is regulated under the Clean Air Act’s hazardous air pollutant
provision embodied in Section 112, other pollutants emitted by that source 
category are excluded from regulation under Section 111(d), which is the
70. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency, 134 S. Ct. 
2427, 2445 (2014). 
71. See Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the 
World’s Critical Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 43, 72 n.159 (2016) 
(discussing that the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) and the “best available
control technology” (BACT) are both similarly economically-determined emission standards). 
72. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, § 111(d)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015)). 
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legal foundation of the Clean Power Plan.73 In contrast, under the House
version of Section 111(d), only the pollutants regulated under Section 112
that are exempt from regulation under Section 111(d).  This presents a 
case of first impression as the Clean Power Plan is now challenged.74 
When both are included in the final bill, canons of statutory construction 
would give full intended interpretation to all words included in a final 
legislative version.  The plaintiff challengers will submit that a rulemaking 
to regulate the same sources under both Sections 111(d) and 112 is ultra
vires because the amended Act prohibits statewide regulation under the
former and direct source regulation under the latter.  Though the EPA may
admit that this is one interpretation of the statute, it will argue that this 
interpretation could not be the intent of Congress, because if it were, then
Section 111(d) would be almost completely useless, as “over 100 source
categories, covering the full range of American industry, have been
regulated under section 7412 in regard to some hazardous pollutant.”75 
EPA will counter that it has the discretion pursuant to the Chevron
doctrine to choose one version of legislative language in a statute and ignore
the other.  In an earlier challenge, the EPA explained that prior to 1990 it 
was plainly able to regulate existing sources using Section 111(d).76  The
1990 bill did not mention a concern that sources would be double regulated;
it only prohibited the double-regulation of pollutants using Section
111(d).77  However, a footnote Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg included
in her majority opinion in the U.S. Supreme Court decision in American
Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut suggests a more strict construction:78 
EPA may not employ §7411(d) [111(d)] if existing stationary sources of the 
pollutant in question are regulated under the national ambient air quality standard
program, §§7408-7410, or the ‘hazardous air pollutants’ program, § 7412. 
This confronts the courts with whether regulating a plant for hazardous 
air pollutants under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, which EPA uses to
regulate coal plant emissions, thus could bar EPA from issuing carbon
73. See Avi Zevin, Dueling Amendments: The Applicability of Section 111(d) of the 
Clean Air Act to Greenhouse Gases 3–4 (Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Working Paper No. 
2014/5), http://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/2014-5_Zevin.pdf. 
74. In re Murray Energy Corporation, 788 F.3d 330,335 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
75. Id. 
76. Brief of Respondent at 36–37, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 372, No. 
14-1112, (D.C. June 25, 2014). 
77. See id., West Virginia Amici Brief, at 7.
78.  American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2357 (2011). 
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dioxide standards under Section 111(d) now through Clean Power Plan
executive action.79  Because power plants as a category, and specifically 
coal-fired power plants, are regulated under Section 112, it becomes a 
matter to be confronted by a likely divided court as to which interpretation 
controls and whether EPA had authority to issue its final regulations.80  If 
states do not comply, federal implementation plans (FIPs) applying rate-
based limits on all large fossil-fuel-fired plants can be imposed on a state
by EPA after 2018.81 
C. The “Second Shoe” of “Cooperative Federalism” 
Two deeper legal questions are presented:  (1) Can a federal agency, 
such as EPA, enjoy deference to determine the substantive scope of its own
authority to take unilateral executive actions without specific congressional 
authority, and (2) if so, what happens when states refuse to “cooperate”
with “cooperative federalism” regarding CO2 limitations (as several states 
have said they will not, and as Senate majority leader McConnell is urging 
states not to cooperate).82  As to the first question, in 2013, the Supreme 
Court held that federal agencies have discretion to determine the substantive 
scope of their own authority.83 
As to the second question, there are precedents for this under the Clean
Air Act. For attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards, federal
law provides states complete discretion under state SIPs as to how states 
achieve and maintain required NAAQS.84  The EPA only has discretion to 
veto a state SIP if the macro-level math does not compute, regardless of 
the micro-level policy choices made by the state to achieve compliance.85 
The Clean Air Act scheme has been interpreted “as erecting a statutory 
79. EPA’s Proposal to Update the Air Quality Standards for Ground-Level Ozone: 
Designations, Monitoring and Permitting Requirements, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at 2. 
80. The EPA asserts in the preamble and in the legal memorandum supporting the 
proposed rule that this conflict creates an ambiguity that the agency may resolve, and that 
it is entitled to deference under Chevron. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 FR. 22392­
01 (Apr. 13, 2012). 
81. Jeremy M. Tarr, The Clean Air Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics 
of Section 111(d), NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIV., Table 1 
(Sept. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13­
03.pdf.
82. Coral Davenport, McConnell Urges State to Defy U.S. Plan to cut Greenhouse 
Gas, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/politics/
mcconnell-urges-states-to-defy-us-plan-to-cut-greenhouse-gas.html. 
83. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013). 
84. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 187 
(6th ed. 2013). 
85. Id. 
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federalism bar” that “prohibits EPA from using the SIP process to force 
[s]tates to adopt specific control measures.86 
If an SIP would result in compliance with EPA standards, the EPA may
not question the choices of the state as to how it complies with them.87 
Moreover, the EPA cannot condition its approval of state SIPs on the
adoption of specific control measures by states.88 States have the “first­
implementer role,”89  while EPA “is relegated . . . to a secondary role.”90 
The EPA has “no authority to question the wisdom of a state’s choice of 
emission limitations if they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards 
of [Section 110].”91 
Yet, the EPA strongly influences state discretion in this cooperative 
model through its threat to drop the second shoe of taking over state 
decisions with a Federal Implementation Plan.92  As part of achieving SIP
compliance, the EPA issues Alternative Control Technique documents
(ACTs) for all sources with emissions of NOx larger than 25 tons per year 
(TPY), as a guide for Reasonably Achievable Control Technology (RACT)
on existing stationary sources.93  The EPA also issues Control Technique
Guidelines (CTGs) regarding RACT techniques for VOC emissions.94 
These target power generation facility emissions for limitation. 
Courts have noted that EPA guidance on ACTs and CTGs for RACT 
are only “informal suggestions.”95  While not required to follow the CTGs 
or ACTs, these do a significant part of the design work for the states, and 
ACTs describe what techniques EPA will more readily approve when
exercising routine approval over SIPs.96  While states have discretion to 
86. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d 7, 31 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
87.  Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
88.  Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1404(D.C. Cir. 1997). 
89. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 28 (quoting Train, 421 U.S. at 
79) (emphasis omitted).
90.  Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
91. See Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1407–08 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Union
Electric Co. v. Train, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)). 
92. See infra, text at notes 99–102. 
93. State Implementation Plans for National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air
Quality Standards, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (1977).
94. 45 Fed. Reg. 78121 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 
95. Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Costle, 515 F. Supp. 264, 278 (N.D. Ill. 1981) 
(arguing that CTGs, while informal guidelines, are preemptory attempts by the EPA to
force states to follow EPA targeting of power plants, court deferred deciding this issue); 
see also Nat’l Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983). 
96. 57 Fed. Reg. 13498 (1992). 
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follow the CTGs and ACTs or develop their own alternative techniques to 
control emissions, these place significant pressure on the states to do what
EPA’s ACTs and CTGs suggest in order to expedite state SIP approval by
EPA.97  If disapproved, the EPA eventually can impose a FIPs and/or there
can be loss of federal highway funds.98  The Clean Air Act affords states 
a period of time to submit a new or revised SIP after the EPA sets emission
standards.99  If the state fails to submit a timely or sufficient SIP, the EPA 
may enforce a FIP.100  However, in fact, there is more EPA influence/ 
control of state environmental decisions with the addition of the jurisdictional 
battle over the Clean Power Plan.101 
D. Added Federal Authority when Multistate Dispersion of 

Air Pollution is Involved 

Air pollution generally drifts and spreads in a down-wind direction.
However, nothing is more global than CO2 and global warning; a molecule 
of CO2 or other global warming gas emitted anywhere warms the entire 
planet, not just the region where the emission occurred. And when there 
is a necessity to arrest interstate contribution to pollution, this multi-state 
air regulation has been upheld as a federal EPA responsibility.
The original EPA interstate endeavor regarding criteria pollutants, the 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) cap-and-trade regulation was stricken in 
2008 by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.102 EPA next issued and substituted 
the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) addressing interstate air
transport of SO2 and NOx contributing to ground-level ozone and fine
particle pollution from fossil fuel-fired power plants in 27 Eastern states.103 
The D.C. Circuit court initially struck CSAPR because of its flawed 
method for determining the emission reduction obligation imposed on
states.104 CSAPR imposed a FIP on the states before they could file a SIP
and have it reviewed as to adequacy.105  EPA argued that states are obligated
97. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c); see also FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra
note 1, at 6-344 through 6-345. 
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(a); N.R.D.C. v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
99.  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 
100. Id. at § 7410(c)(1). 
101.  53 Fed. Reg. 49,500 (1988).
102. Id.
103. Clean Air Act § 110(a)(2)(D) (42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)); 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 
48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011). 
104.  EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 31. 
105. Id. at 28.  Critics of CSAPR suggested that the rule was passed too quickly and 
that it illustrated the EPA’s “unusual sense of urgency, even at the expense of procedural
obligations under the CAA and the Administrative Procedures Act.”  Margaret Campbell 
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to comply with NAAQS and the “good neighbor provision” simultaneously,
and that the regulated states had failed to submit an appropriate SIP, entitling 
the EPA to enforce a FIP.106 
The D.C. Circuit court held that the EPA’s argument was flawed
because EPA crossed this federalism barrier by forcing states by default 
to conform to a federal FIP without giving them the opportunity to file a 
SIP.107 It did not defer to state implementation plans and state discretion 
in implementation under the federalism split authority of the Clean Air 
Act.108  By imposing a FIP before states had the opportunity to submit a
SIP, the EPA violated fundamental principles of federalism.109 The court
took a “hard look” and held that one level of government cannot cross the 
federalist line of its jurisdiction “down the rabbit hole.”110 
In a 6-2 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit holding 
in 2014, reaffirming deference to agency discretion in devising Clean Air
Act regulations, as per Chevron: “The statute … calls upon the Agency
to address a thorny causation problem: How should EPA allocate among
multiple contributing upwind States responsibility for a downwind State’s 
excess pollution?”111 The Court allowed the EPA leeway to devise its air 
control scheme for interstate cross-state pollution. The majority opinion 
denominates the allocation choices EPA made as “sensible,” “equitable,”
& Byron Kirkpatrick, The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule and EPA’s Rush to Regulate, 43 
No. 3 ABA TRENDS 6, 7 (2012). 
106. See EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 32. 
107. Id. at 33. 
108. Id. at 37. While employing a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-
state pollution, the court found that it required some states to reduce emissions by more
than they contributed to downwind state pollution.  Fifteen states sought review of CSAPR, 
while six states intervened to support the rule. Id. at 38.
 109. See Texas v. EPA, 690 F.3d 670, 679–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (demonstrating the 
Fifth Circuit’s EPA deference to SIP’s); contra Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 198–99 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013). 
110.  EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 696 F.3d at 33. 
111. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA (In re EME Homer City Generation),
134 S. Ct. 1584, 1604 (2014). 
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“efficient” and “making good sense,”112 citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837.113 
The Court concluded that EPA must give states a reasonable opportunity
to allocate their emission budgets before issuing FIPs.114  The Clean Air 
Act was held to mandates SIP compliance with the good neighbor provision,
which requires SIPs to “contain adequate provisions . . . prohibiting . . . 
any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from 
emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly
to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with 
respect to any . . . [NAAQS].  42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i).”115 
The Supreme Court’s dissenting opinion, agreeing with the D.C. Circuit
Court majority, underscored limits to unilateral executive action, concluding:
“Too many important decisions of the Federal Government are made
nowadays by unelected agency officials exercising broad lawmaking authority,
rather than by the people’s representatives in Congress. Today, the 
majority approves [a] undemocratic revision of the Clean Air Act.”116 
This dissent echoes strands of the non-delegation doctrine.117 This did not
end the contest:  The Utility Air Regulatory Group then challenged the EPA’s
technical revisions to the cross-state rule, including revised emissions
budgets for thirteen states.118 
112. Id. at 1607; id. at 1593–94 (“[C]urtailing interstate air pollution poses a complex
challenge for environmental regulators. . . .  The overlapping and interwoven linkages 
between upwind and downwind States with which EPA had to contend number in the 
thousands. . . . Rather, as the gases emitted by upwind polluters are carried downwind, 
they are transformed, through various chemical processes, into altogether different 
pollutants. The offending gases at issue in these cases—nitrogen oxide (NOX) and sulfur
dioxide (SO2)—often develop into ozone and fine particulate matter (PM2.5) by the time
they reach the atmospheres of downwind States.”). 
113. Under Chevron, Congress’ silence effectively delegates authority to EPA to
select from among reasonable options. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218, 
229 (2001). EPA’s chosen allocation method was held to be a “permissible construction
of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
114. In re EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. at 1600. 
115. Id.
 116. Id. at 1595 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
117. See  STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 42– 
43 (6th ed. 2013).
118. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, No. 12-1346 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2014).
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The federal circuit court of appeals, in a unanimous opinion written by 
Judge Richard Posner, upheld FERC approval of independent electric
power system operator allocation of the terms and costs of transmission
of renewable energy to all consumers in the ISO.119 Judge Posner and the
circuit court cited a law review article by Professor Ferrey as authority for 
the federal and state legal and constitutional requirements determining 
electric power regulation of renewable energy policy,120 and noted that
states cannot discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy. The
Seventh Circuit declared unconstitutional state unequal treatment of
in-state low-carbon renewable generation compared to out-of-state renewable
energy, as a violation of the Commerce Clause: “[it] trips over an 
insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating 
the commerce clause of Article I of the Constitution, discriminate against
out-of-state renewable energy.”121 
Another federal court held that the Act invests the FERC with “exclusive
authority to regulate the transmission and sale at wholesale of electric energy 
in interstate commerce,” and struck state regulation as unconstitutional:122 
Congress has drawn a bright line between state and federal authority in the setting
of wholesale rates and in the regulation of agreements that affect wholesale rates.
States may not regulate in areas where FERC has properly exercised its
jurisdiction to determine just and reasonable wholesale rates or to insure that
agreements affecting wholesale rates are reasonable. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. 
Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 374 (1988) . . . a state “must . . . give effect to
Congress’ desire to give FERC plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates, 
and to ensure that the States do not interfere with this authority.” Nantahala
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) . . . Under the “filed­
rate doctrine,” state courts and regulatory agencies are preempted by federal law 
119.  Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 777 (7th Cir. 2013). 
120. Id. at 776. 
121. Id. Michigan actually initiated the issue of in-state electric power discrimination 
in its RPS program as a demonstration that out-of-state powered transmitted to it was not
recognized as of the same value as in-state electricity, therefore Michigan should not pay
a share of power line tariffs transmitting power from out of state that did not have equal 
recognition and benefit. Instead of supporting its position, this assertion caused Judge 
Posner to respond to this assertion, even though it was not the tariff issue before the Court. 
See id.
122. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC v. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d 183, 233
(D. Vt. 2012) (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340
(1982)); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
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from requiring the payment of rates other than the federal filed rate.  See Entergy
La., Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 539 U.S. 39, 47 (2003) (“The filed rate 
doctrine requires ‘that interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC
must be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate
rates.’”).123 
FERC also regulates discrimination in who is permitted to build new 
transmission capacity in those two-thirds of the states which participate in
an ISO to manage the transmission grids of multiple utilities. FERC
approves all RTO and ISO terms of service and the financial tariffs.124 
FERC Order 1000 requires incumbent transmission providers (utilities) 
and the RTOs that manage regional multi-state transmission systems, to
remove rights-of-first-refusal from FERC-approved transmission tariffs.125 
Where there is a state right-of-first-refusal, the deck is effectively is
stacked against non-incumbent transmission providers, despite any
opportunity to compete through an RTO-administered competitive 
transmission project selection process. While FERC regulates the terms
of transmissions service, states regulate the construction of the transmission
facilities themselves.126  This federal regulation was upheld by the D.C.
Circuit.127 
IV. CONCLUSION
Subnational governance is an operative concept embedded in the fabric 
of American law. It is even more profoundly etched in energy regulation
since enactment of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and in environmental 
regulation since the Clean Air Act amendments in 1970.  There is significant 
tension, or in some cases direct conflict, between federal energy and
environmental regulation.  In a second dimension, there is conflict in 
“cooperative federalism” between federal and state authority in
environmental regulation.  Both national and subnational levels of 
government need to be synchronized to effectively address climate 
change, which synchronization has not yet occurred, and is not mitigated
by the recent Clean Power Plan. 
123. Shumlin, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 233–34 (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986)) (internal citations omitted). 
124. FERREY, THE NEW RULES, supra note 33, at 49–50. 
125. 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842-01. See Rishi Garg, What’s Best for the States: A Federally
Imposed Competitive Solicitation Model or a Preference for the Incumbent? State Adoption of
Right of First Refusal Statutes in Response to FERC Order 1000 and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, NRRI, Briefing Paper No. 13–04 (April 2013), for an excellent treatment of this 
issue.
126.  76 Fed. Reg. 49,842-01. 
127. South Carolina Public Service Authority v. FERC, 762 F.3d 131 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (challenging FERC Order 1000, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (July 21, 2011)).
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There is no federal case law, nor any regulatory FERC, DOE, or EPA 
rules, which have resolved such direct conflicts between a FERC order or
other regulation on necessary energy generation, and an EPA order or
regulation on resultant emissions to the environment.  Both operate 
independently. It is now a case of first impression for the judiciary.
The Clean Power Plan requires that EPA sets standards, and that states 
choose from a variety of options to achieve aggressive carbon reduction.
Without both national and subnational levels of government coordinating
cooperatively, the program will not be successful.  One-third of U.S. states 
already sued EPA contesting federal authority even before the Clean
Power Plan regulation was promulgated in final form, and once final, 
more than half the states became challengers to this new federal
environmental requirement imposed on power generation facilities.  The 
Supreme Court took the unusual step of staying implementation of the 
CPP even before the D.C. Circuit had heard a challenge to the CPP.  The 
escalating degree of fundamental dissent between subnational and national
levels of government, and between energy and environmental objectives, 
is increasingly palpable. 
There will be legal conflict and friction during the next three years as 
states develop CPP plans or refuse to do so, and the courts wrestle with legal
challenges to the rule and the plans developed by the states thereunder. Both 
energy and environmental regulation will be in motion.  It creates significant 
new tensions and conflicts in “cooperative federalism” and the development 
and operation of energy generation.  How this unfolds legally in the U.S.
has major international implications for other major CO2 emitting countries 
with strong subnational governance embedded in their legal structures,
including Canada, India, and Germany.
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